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A POLICY RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN
JACK KEMP
John J. Potts *
INTRODUCTION
This commentary sets out to critique the Kemp-Kasten bill1 described by Con-
gressman Jack Kemp in his recent Journal of Legislation article.2 It will examine
some of the problems with the current Federal income tax system, demonstrate
that Kemp-Kasten retains many of the flaws of the present system, and address
selected inequities contained in the Kemp-Kasten tax proposal.
Our present income tax system was enacted under authority granted to Con-
gress by the 16th Amendment to the United States Constitution. That amend-
ment permits taxation of "incomes, from whatever source derived." 3 While a
coherent income tax system should have among its fundamental theoretical goals
the measurement of income, and its taxation once and only once,4 the present
income system does not accomplish either of these two goals.
Instead, our income tax system consists of two conceptually distinct and con-
flicting systems whose net affect is to selectively tax certain types of income while
preferentially exempting or moderating taxation on other forms of income.5 The
Associate Professor Of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A., University of New Mexico,
1969; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1974, M.S., Northeastern University, 1975. Member of the
New Mexico Bar; C.P.A., New Mexico. I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Richard T. Stith,
III, of Valparaiso University School of Law, for commenting on drafts of this commentary. I am also
indebted to the following law students at Valparaiso University School of Law School: Mr. Robert D.
Brown, Mr. Cassidy C. Fritz, Mr. Tallam I. Nguti, Mr. Richard J. Rupcich, and Mr. Jeffrey P.
VanGroll.
1. H.R. 777, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. H215 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1985).
2. Kemp, Federal Tax Law: The Need for Radical Reform, 12 J. LEGIS. 1 (1985).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI provides: "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without
regard to any census or enumeration."
Many definitions of the word "income" have been proposed. For purposes of this article "in-
come" is defined as the sum of the increases in net worth which result from profit-seeking events
(which implies subtraction of the costs of those transactions) plus the sum of the increases in net worth
which result from events which are not necessarily profit-seeking in nature but which nevertheless
produce an increase in net worth (which does not imply subtraction of the costs of these personal
events except to the extent necessary to measure increases in net worth which actually result from
events which are not profit-seeking in nature). For instance, a person who makes his living writing
movie reviews could deduct the cost of going to the movies, while a recreational movie viewer could
not. In contrast, a person who writes movie reviews as a hobby and who occasionally sells a review,
but who has no realistic expectation of making a net profit over time, could deduct costs incurred in
writing reviews but only to the extent of the amount of revenues generated by the reviews. See Surrey
& McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Issues, 20 B.C. L.
REv. 225, at 228 (1979).
4. At the present time we do not tax either mere appreciation in value or imputed income. Id. Although
these are economic income, they do not enter into "gross income" calculations under I.R.C. § 61(a)
and therefore are not "taxable income" under I.R.C. § 63. This income is ignored by both the present
system and by Kemp-Kasten. Despite the theoretical and practical significance of failure to consider
this income for tax purposes, and despite the theoretical applicability of tax expenditure analysis to
this income, the difficulties raised by the existence of these two forms of income will be ignored in the
present analysis -just as they are ignored by the tax expenditure budget. Id. The normative starting
point of both the present system and Kemp-Kasten for the time at which the income tax system
should first take cognizance of income is when the income is realized.
5. See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementating Government Policy: A Comparison with
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true income tax portion of the system has as its goals the accurate measurement of
income and its taxation once and only once. 6 A secondary and conceptually dis-
tinct framework within the Tax Code establishes a system of subsidies, intended to
implement a variety of social or economic policies.7 This program of subsidies
prevents the income taxation component of the present system from achieving its
objectives.
The unsystematic interplay of the taxation and tax subsidy components creates
three problems for the Federal tax system. First, selectively subsidizing some tax-
payers by not collecting taxes otherwise due results in the imposition of a dispro-
portionate tax burden on other taxpayers at the same income levels.8 Second, this
policy makes the system unnecessarily complex.9 Third, the combination of these
two components within a single system masks the tax subsidy element which an-
nually aggregates at a level far exceeding the annual deficit.) °
Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705-6 (1970) ("[t]he term 'tax expenditure' has
been used to describe those special provisions of the federal income tax system which represent gov-
ernment expenditures made through that system to achieve various social and economic objectives").
6. S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL AND H. AULT, 1 FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 239-241
(1972).
7. Id.; 1968 Sec'y Treas. Ann. Rep. on the State of the Finances 326-30.
8. It is this comparison which is the best conceptual genesis of the idea of the tax expenditure analysis.
9. See Surrey, supra note 5, at 731 ("the tax system is complex enough as it is, and to have a large
number of tax incentives side by side with the provisions making up the structure of the tax itself can
only cause confusion and a blurring of concepts and objectives").
10. Time and again subsidies have been passed by Congress which would not even be proposed if they had
to be cast in the economically equivalent but more easily understood form of a direct outlay. See
Surrey, supra note 5, at 272 ("it is doubtful that most of our existing tax incentives would ever have
been introduced, let alone accepted, if so structured [as direct expenditures]. ). See also note 15,
infra.
Some argue that the difference between the mechanics of giving a tax subsidy and one accom-
plished as a direct outlay is inherently significant. When one does not pay taxes which would other-
wise be due, so the argument goes, one gets to keep one's own money; whereas when one receives a
direct outlay, one is receiving someone else's money. For a person of this view, it might follow logi-
cally that a moral significance might be attached to the difference. Someone advancing this argument
is unlikely to admit that a tax expenditure is a subsidy. A person advancing the argument would
almost certainly object to my suggestion that what is involved is but a "difference in the mechanics."
Nevertheless, by my phraseology, I certainly do mean that nothing more significant has happened
than that the file has been papered differently, and that there is no substantive difference between the
two forms of subsidy. I mean, in other words, that the only difference in the what of the event is in the
mechanics.
The objection reflects several misunderstandings. It misses that the claim that the two mecha-
nisms are equivalent is a fact, not a viewpoint. Stating that it is a fact is not itself an argument for or
against either mechanism, nor is it an argument for choosing one mechanism over the other. It merely
provides insight into what is happening for purposes of further analysis. The objection misses appre-
ciation of the legal rights involved in the two mechanisms - that the person benefitting from the tax
subsidy has as much right whatever the nature of the right, but neither more nor less right, to the
benefit as the person receiving the direct outlay. Insofar as current law might be considered a norma-
tive standard for determining one's entitlement to a benefit, law can (and has) created entitlement of
both varieties.
Underlying the objection may be implicit a view that individualistic man reaps from nature ac-
cording to his just reward based on his idiosyncratic productivity. This eccentric view fails to under-
stand the systemic basis of income and therefore of wealth in the United States today. If man at a very
tender age crawls naked and alone into the forest and years later sallies forth from his now native
environment with wagons, which he has built himself with his own inventiveness with axes and ham-
mers which he has also built himself with his own inventiveness, drawn by beasts of burden which he
has captured, tamed and trained himself, bearing the additional accumulations of wealth which he has
stoutly and alone wrought from the world and amalgamated into his personal holdings, then the
model would have some appeal. Claims based in moral philosophy, against him and his wealth from
the needy people he meets (the need might relate to the costs of common defense, not just bread for
the belly) might be available nonetheless, but are not necessary to deal with the objection. The man
described does not exist. Income and therefore wealth in the United States today are systemically
based, resulting from the interplay of innumerable aspects of the system pursuant to the rules on the
basis of which income is made and therefore wealth is accumulated.
Personal responsibility for one's income and wealth as the norm is further bellied by the fact that
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The Kemp-Kasten proposal eliminates many indirect subsidies1' but retains a
large majority. 12 Thus, while some specifics would change, the system would re-
tain its dual taxation/subsidy structure. Moreover, while it would simplify the
present tax system, Kemp-Kasten remains unnecessarily complex. Finally, while
Kemp-Kasten may reduce the subterfuge in the present system, a large subsidy
apparatus will continue to be obscured from the public, thus perpetuating many of
the inequalities Congressman Kemp's bill purports 
to rectify.'m
INCOHERENCE OF PRESENT LAW
"Tax expenditure" analysis is a powerful analytical framework for under-
standing the significance of a "tax incentive". 4 Congress often creates a tax in-
centive by abrogating tax liability on certain income. The failure to tax certain
income, either by excluding the income or by allowing special deductions or cred-
its against tax liability, promotes additional spending by taxpayers. This result is
commonly referred to as a tax incentive. The resulting reduction in taxes is as
much of the wealth in the United States today was inherited. If one thinks a person owns his property
in an absolute sense, as if he is the source of his own underlying patent in land, for instance, one
would have to object in principle to use of a power of eminent domain. I do not object to the use of the
power of eminent domain, or to use of the taxing power.
At ground, the objection fails to accept the if clause as a given in the hypothetical: if one accepts
the rate structure which does exist in the law as normative, then those on whom its burden falls with a
lighter than anticipated touch are being subsidized - when compared to those who are paying tax
pursuant to the rate structure. Despite all this, an attitude that there is such a difference could help
explain the present state of affairs. See note 15 infra and accompanying text. As discussed in note 15
infra, there are differences in view regarding how best to measure the subsidies. Regardless, the com-
parison is accurate no matter which measurement methodology is followed. However, repeal of tax
expenditures on my broad scale would not necessarily mean that the government would recoup an
equivalent amount of money in receipts. See Special Analysis G, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FY 1985, at G15-G17.
11. See H.R. 777, supra note 1, §§ 201, 211, 228 (1985). The Kemp-Kasten proposal would eliminate only
one-third of the subsidies of the present system. Kemp-Kasten would eliminate, for example, I.R.C.
§ 22 (relating to credit for the elderly and the permanently and totally disabled), § 23 (relating to
contributions to candidates for public office), § 29 (relating to credit for producing fuel from a noncon-
ventional source), § 30 (relating to credit for increasing research activities), § 116 (relating to partial
exclusion of dividends received by individuals), § 124 (relating to qualified transportation furnished by
employer), § 305(e) (relating to dividend reinvestment in public utilities), § 196 (relating to deduction
for unused business credits), § 221 (relating to deduction for two-earner married couples).
12. The Kemp-Kasten proposal retains two-thirds of the subsidies of the present tax system, sometimes in
modified form. For example, the following indirect subsidies would be retained: I.R.C. § 163 (relating
to home mortgage interest), § 164 (relating to real property taxes), § 168 (relating to accelerated cost
recovery), § 170 (relating to charitable contributions), § 213(a)(1) (relating to catastrophic medical
expenses), § 408 (relating to treatment of IRAs).
An analysis of the dollar quantity of subsidies which would be retained by Kemp-Kasten should
be a prerequisite to adoption of the proposal. The best basis on which to make the appropriate com-
parison is not completely obvious. A projected tax expenditure budget under Kemp-Kasten, using the
proposal's nonsubsidy provisions as the baseline for comparison, is certainly called for. It would also
be instructive, however, to see a projected tax expenditure budget reflecting the subsidies which would
exist after adoption while using the normative provisions of present law as the baseline for comparison.
To the extent all people received the same dollar subsidy from the latter tax expenditure budget, the
"subsidies" could be ignored for the same reason it would be in any tax expediture budget. It is not
really a subsidy. For example, the increase in the personal exemption deduction would be a candidate
for such treatment. But a lowering of the rate brackets for only some people, or a lowering of the rate
brackets more for higher income people than for lower income people, would produce a subsidy
amount when viewed in relation to what the normative provisions of present law suggest are the
appropriate tax liabilities. This is not the standard use of tax expenditure analysis. However, it would
yield information important to appraising the Kemp-Kasten proposal, namely its results (at least when
viewed in a static model comparison).
13. According to Surrey, "[m]ost tax incentives have decidely adverse effects on equity as between taxpay-
ers on the same income level, and also, with respect to the individual income tax, between taxpayers on
different income levels." Surrey, supra note 5, at 722.
14. See Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expedi-
tures With Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352, 360-61 (1970).
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much a subsidy as is a direct outlay of Federal money."1
Many tax deductions inhere in the idea of income because they are costs of
securing income. t6 Elimination of these deductions would preclude accurate
measurement of income.1 7 Other deductions, however, are not costs of earning
income. Their deduction is not required by the idea of income for they are not
necessary to its measurement.t" Their elimination is required in order to accu-
15. If a taxpayer in the 50% tax rate bracket receives a $10,000 deduction for interest payments made
during a single year on his home mortgage, the taxpayer saves $5,000 in Federal income taxes. The
$10,000 deduction makes his taxable income $10,000 less, and in the 50% rate bracket he pays 50% of
$10,000, or $5,000 less in taxes. A person with the same level and types of economic income but
without a mortgage does not receive the deduction and does not have his tax burden lowered by
$5,000. The result, economically, is the same as if these two people paid the same amount of taxes, but
only one received a subsidy check from the Federal Government for $5,000 as part of national housing
policy. As Surrey notes "[tihe interplay is such that for any given program involving federal monetary
assistance, the program may be structured to use the tax system to provide that assistance - where it
will usually be called a tax incentive - or structured to use a direct government expenditure." Id. at
354.
The proper way to measure tax expenditures, it was formerly agreed, was to estimate the taxes not
paid because of a special provision of tax law in all transactions qualifying for special treatment. In
1983, however, the Office of Management and Budget decided to express tax expenditures in terms of
their "outlay equivalents" estimated in a way which produces results that are different from results
expressed in terms of "revenue loss." Evolutions during this time period in the baseline for compari-
son used by the Office of Management and Budget for generating tax expenditure estimates are signifi-
cant but not of central relevance here. The difference between the outlay equivalent estimates and the
revenue loss estimates is that the former have been grossed-up to the pre-tax amounts an outlay would
cost the Government on the assumption that the outlay would be taxable. The Government would,
therefore, receive part of the outlay back in taxes. The revenue loss estimates are thought to be the
amount of benefit to the taxpayer remaining if the outlay equivalent estimates were taxable. The
revenue loss estimates reach directly the benefit to the taxpayer because taxes not paid are in fact not
treated an income for tax purposes today. While there are good reasons for estimating outlay
equivalents on the assumption of their taxability, I find it more meaningful for present purposes to
think in terms of nontaxable outlay equivalents precisely because the revenue losses of the present tax
subsidy system are in fact nontaxable. In other words, I find it more meaningful to think in terms of
the revenue loss estimates. When I refer, in this article, to the direct outlay equivalent of a tax subsidy,
I mean a direct outlay which is exempt from taxation. I am thereby putting tax subsidies and direct
outlays on the same footing: if one is nontaxable then the other should be expressed in nontaxable
terms as well.
The fiscal year 1985 Special Analysis G contains tables for both taxable outlay equivalents and
nontaxable revenue losses. All tax expenditure figures used in this article are taken from the revenue
loss table and are estimates for fiscal year 1985. See generally Special Analyses G, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FY 1985.
16. Those deductions fitting the "norm" in this context are those necessary to properly measure income.
The Federal Tax Code does not define "income" though a common definition of the term specifies:
"The gain derived from capital... [or] true increase in amount of wealth which comes to a person
during a stated period of time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) Section 212 of the Code
permits the deduction from taxable income "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year - (1) for the production or collection of income." I.R.C. § 212(1) (1982).
17. If you purchase candles for $40 and sell them for $100, your income is $60. It is not $100.
18. For example, deducting $20 (one half of the cost of the candles in note 17) before selling the candles,
would artificially lower measured income from economic reality by $20. This allows the taxpayer to
deduct a cost not yet incurred. The taxpayer will receive a subsidy for that year of $20 times the
applicable rate bracket. This is precisely what happens in accelerated depreciation. See Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-345, 95 Stat. 172 (codified at I.R.C. § 168) (1982). See also
S. REP. No. 97-144 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 48, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE & CONG. AD. NEWS 15.
The Senate Finance Committee described the 1981 amendments:
The committee bill replaces the present system of depreciation with the Accelerated Cost
Recovery System (ACRS). ACRS permits recovery of capital costs for most tangible deprecia-
ble property using accelerated methods of cost recovery over predetermined recovery periods
generally unrelated to, but shorter than, present law useful lives. The methods of cost recovery
and recovery periods are the same for both new and used property.
Under the new system, the cost of eligible personal property is recovered over a 15-year,
10-year, 5-year, or 3-year period depending on the type of property. Most eligible personal
property is in the 5-year class. Cars, light-duty trucks, research and experimentation equip-
ment, and certain other short-lived property are in the 3-year class. Theme park structures,
railroad tank cars, and certain long-lived public utility property are in the 10-year class. Cer-
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rately measure income.
Implicit in the characterization of the tax benefits from certain deductions as
subsidies is the premise that the higher taxes which would have been paid but for
the specially allowed deduction are an appropriate normative basis for compari-
son. That two people with the same economic income are not taxed the same
means that one receives a subsidy when compared to the other.19 If all taxpayers
receive the same tax subsidies, the subsidy is no longer special but general. Under
these circumstances, they become, in effect, adjustments in the rate table. The
failure to collect particular taxes would benefit all taxpayers and would no longer
constitute a subsidy.2°
This tax expenditure analysis is applicable to all specially allowed exclusions,
tain other long-lived public utility property ahs a 15-year recovery period. Eligible real prop-
erty is placed in a separate 15-year real property class. To provide flexibility, certain longer
optional recovery periods are provided.
Recovery of costs generally is determined by using a statutory accelerated method. As an
option, the taxpayer may choose to recover costs using the straight-line method over either the
regular recovery period or the longer recovery periods provided.
The entire cost or other basis of eligible property is recovered under the new system, elimi-
nating the salvage value limitation under present law.
Eligible property includes depreciable property other than (1) property the taxpayer prop-
erly elects to amortize (e.g., leasehold improvements or low-income rehabilitation expendi-
tures) and (2) most property the taxpayer properly elects to depreciate under a method not
expressed in terms of years (e.g., unit-of-production or income forecast methods). However,
railroad property currently depreciated undr the retirement-replacement-betterment method is
included in ACRS, subject to special transitional rules.
The committee bill provides a provision for the limited expensing of eligivle property and
special rules relating to cost recovery for foreign assets, normalization requirements for public
utility jproperty, and the computation of earnings and profits and of the minimum tax. Special
rules also are provided to prevent the "churning" of used property between certain persons
solely to obtain the benefits of increased investment incentives under ACRS. In addition,
ACRS establishes new rules for determining if the nominal lessor is entitled to recovery deduc-
tions and investment credits for certain leased recovery property.
19. The opposite comparison is also fair. In the text the person paying the higher amount in taxes is used
as the basis for comparison. If, however, the person paying the lower amount is used as the basis for
comparison, then it could be said that his more heavily taxed counterpart is being unfairly
overburdened by an inappropriate level of taxes. This conclusion follows with equal validity from its
starting point.
Which way one puts it is probably a test of attitude, not of logic. They have equal logical merit.
Common to both analyses is that one person ends up with more money than the other by reason of
different treatment by the Government. What they also have in common is that the basic notion of
fairness for a tax system, that similarly economically situated people should be treated similarly, is
violated, and that, accepting either level of tax as normative, income is not measured the same way
and subjected to the same tax rate schedule once and only once. Either one taxpayer is undertaxed or
the other is overtaxed. Both analyses therefore admit the principal point: the system does not achieve
its theoretical objectives of measuring income and taxing it once and only once. The difference in
perspective in how one reaches that conclusion is quite beside the point. Moreover, both analyses
allow the conclusion that if the people were treated the same, and if the Government collected the
same total taxes from the two people after equalization in treatment as it did before, then the present
nominal rate structure could be lowered. As to the two taxpayers compared in note 15, supra, at
present the Government collects a total of $5,000 (on the portion of income under discussion) from the
two people - all of it from one and none from the other. The Government could instead collect a
total of $5,000 from the two people by collecting $2,500 from each. Interestingly, this raises the
theoretical possibility of considering what the progressive rate structure would be after elimination of
tax expenditures and a resulting reduction in rates as the appropriate normative basis for comparison.
20. If the subsidy mechanism involved direct outlays rather than indirect tax expenditures, analysis simi-
lar to that contained in note 19, supra, would apply. The person receiving the direct outlay would
have the same legal right, neither more nor less, to his subsidy as when received as a tax expenditure.
When the same economic benefit is cast in this form it is less likely that anyone would quibble with use
of the word "subsidy". But one could speak of the recipient as receiving his due entitlement under the
law, and speak of his less fortunate counterpart who does not receive the direct outlay as being
penalized.
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deductions and credits, 21 most of which inure to the benefit of far fewer people
than the home mortgage interest deduction. There are over 100 categories of
these special subsidies contained in the estimated tax expenditure budget for 1985,
totaling approximately $353 billion, of which something over $87 billion was to go
to corporations and something over $266 billion was to go to individuals.
The subsidy mechanisms of the tax expenditure budget exempt certain income
from measurement and therefore from taxation.22 Thus, the inclusion of a tax
subsidy component within the Tax Code results in an inevitable failure to achieve
a true tax system's objectives. As a result, the present tax system is both progres-
sive and regressive: many taxpayers at higher income levels are taxed at a higher
rate than taxpayers at lower income levels but many taxpayers are taxed at an
effectively lower rate than those with less income. Many taxpayers pay taxes at
rates far lower than the nominal rate structure would suggest. For the purposes of
graphic presentation of data relating to the rates of progressivity or regressivity in
the present tax structure, two curves could adequately depict the average degree
of progressivity or regressivity for each of these comparisons.23 If charted on the
same graph, these curves cross. When special tax expenditure provisions modify
the rate of progressivity, the effective rate structure will differ from the nominal
rate structure causing the point of intersection between the curves to shift.
The regressive effect of tax subsidies is heightened further since a higher in-
come person receives a larger tax subsidy than a lower income person from the
same amount of special exclusion or deductions.24 In other words, higher income
21. Special Analysis G, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FY 1985,
G43-G48.
22. The discussion in note 19, supra, relating to a possible downward adjustment in rates as a correlative
of elimination of tax subsidies is relevant here. Assuming the validity of the tax expenditure estimates
for 1985, it is true that some taxpayers will pay over $350 billion extra in taxes to compensate for the
revenue loss of over $350 billion in tax subsidies. But it does not necessarily follow that if tax expendi-
tures were eliminated there would be a reduction in taxes of $350 billion. A general lowering of rates
by enough to reduce revenues by $350 bilion would benefit those now disadvantaged, but it would also
lower the nominal rates and therefore the tax burden of those now receiving the tax subsidies from
what it would be if the tax subsidies were removed without lowering the rates. This second group,
now on tax welfare, would pay substantially more in taxes than they do today, but not $350 billion
more - precisely because of the hypothesized lowering of the otherwise applicable nominal rate struc-
ture.
It is likely that part, and possible that all, of the extra $350 billion in taxes that could be collected
would be collected. There are many possible uses to which the money could be put besides a lowering
of the tax rates. Less than two-thirds of the money would be required to eliminate the annual deficit of
$200 billion. The remaining amount, a budget surplus in excess of $150 billion per year, could be used
to retire the accumulated national debt.
A politically saleable package would likely involve a mixture of lower tax rates and deficit reduc-
tion. A careful consideration of the effect on the national and international economy is required prior
to elimination of all tax subsidies. The tax effect of elimination of all tax subsidies would be an in-
crease in taxes of $350 billion spread unevenly throughout the economy. Any sudden increase of this
magnitude would have to be undertaken with care and might have to be phased in over a period of
years. Such care should be exercised even though inadequate consideration was given to enactment of
many of the tax subsidies. See supra note 10.
23. Assuming that such a line would be progressive in some degree, it would nevertheless, among other
things, have averaged together the effect of the two crossing lines. It would therefore be a gross
simplification.
24. See Surrey, supra note 5 at 720. See also Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 3, at 255. This can be seen by
continuing the earlier example involving the home interest deduction. See supra note 15. The tax-
payer in the 50% tax rate bracket was seen to save $5,000 in taxes from a $10,000 interest deduction.
A person in the 25% tax rate bracket saves far less. The analysis becomes more complicated here,
however, because a $10,000 deduction for such a person causes his rate bracket to change. Consider a
married individual filing a joint return with taxable income for 1984 of $29,600 before consideration of
the interest deduction. As the $10,000 deduction reduces taxable income by the first $5,000 (one half
of the total deduction), $1,250 in taxes would be saved. This person then moves into the 22% tax rate
bracket. The next $4,400 of the deduction would save $968 in taxes. The person then moves into the
18% tax rate bracket. The remaining $600 of the deduction would save $108 dollars in taxes. There-
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taxpayers receive a larger subsidy for utilizing special deductions and exclusions
because the taxpayer's per dollar tax reduction is greater. Furthermore, a higher
income person can better afford to take advantage of special exclusions and
deductions.25
Two elements, therefore, permit higher income people to benefit more from
tax subsidies. First, as income increases each dollar of special exclusion or deduc-
tion results in a higher subsidy. Second, higher income people can better afford to
engage in transactions involving special exclusions or deductions and economi-
cally they obtain higher per dollar benefit from a larger quantity of dollars. From
a theoretical perspective, the aesthetic harmony of the fabric of the true income
tax system has been shredded. From a practical perspective, the result is not fair
or simple. A revenue raising system with such a vast, built-in spending apparatus
is a contradiction.
THE KEMP-KASTEN PROPOSAL
The proposed Fair and Simple Tax Act of 1985,26 the Kemp-Kasten bill, rep-
resents a significant departure from present law. While many provisions would
change, only a few of the more revealing will be discussed here.
In place of the present series of nominally progressive tax rates,27 Kemp-Kas-
ten would substitute a single nominally flat rate of 24% for all individuals. 28 It
would, however, have varying zero bracket amounts at levels higher than present
law, making it in reality a progressive tax rate schedule.29 Unlike present law,
however, the proposal would accord special treatment to a portion of an individ-
ual's "employment income"'.3 ° Kemp-Kasten excludes 20% of "employment in-
come"31 up to approximately $40,000, for an $8,000 maximum exclusion.32
fore this person would save a total of $2,326 in taxes or less than half as much as his higher income
neighbor. See I.R.C. § 1 (1982).
25. For example, a taxpayer in the 50% tax bracket may have a $10,000 interest deduction for purchasing
a home. This deduction would reduce the taxpayer's liability by $5,000. This taxpayer in the 50% tax
rate bracket might have a $10,000 home mortgage interest deduction. This is less likely for a person in
the 25% tax rate bracket. If the lower income person pays only $5,000 in interest his taxes would be
reduced by only $1,250. This is only one-fourth of the housing subsidy received by the higher income
person.
26. H.R. 777, supra note 1.
27. For married individuals filing a joint return in taxable years 1985, the tax rate on taxable income above
the zero bracket amount progresses from 11% of the excess over $3,400 up to $5,500, to 50% of the
excess over $162,400 I.R.C. § l(a)(3) (1982).
28. H.R. 777, supra note 1, § 101(a).
29. H.R. 777, supra note 1, § 112; I.R.C. § 63(d) (1982). The zero bracket amount corresponds to a
standard deduction, or an amount of income allowed to be received tax-free. Under the current sys-
tem the zero bracket amount exempts from taxation $2300 on an individual return, $3400 on a joint
return and $1700 for a married individual filing separately. Kemp-Kasten changes the zero bracket
amount to $2600 in the case of an unmarried individual, $3300 in the case of a joint return, and $1650
in the case of an married individual filing a separate return. Id.
30. H.R. 777, supra note 1, § 134. Kemp-Kasten defines "employment income" to include "wages, sala-
ries, tips and other employee compensation" plus "net earnings from self-employment" plus amounts
includible in income from "alimony or separate maintenance payments". Id. § 134(e)(1).
31. Id. § 134(d)(1).
32. The maximum amount of employment income that can be excluded from gross income is 20% of the
FICA maximum wage base for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer began. Id.
§ 134(b). The FICA maximum wage base for 1985 is $39,300. This threshold is determined by a
formula set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1047-1048 (1984). The threshold is adjusted annually to account
for inflation. In addition, there is a special rule for persons whose employment income is $10,000 or
less and who are nevertheless wealthy enough to have "investment income", which is defined as any
income "which is not employment income". Id. § 134(d). In this situation, up to $10,000 of invest-
ment income can be treated as employment income for purposes of obtaining the 20%-of-employment-
income exclusion. Id. For a person with employment income, before consideration of this rule, of
$10,000, the amount of investment income which could be treated as employment income would be 0.
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Excluding 20% of income otherwise subject to a flat tax rate of 24% is the same
as lowering the tax rate by 20%, resulting in an effective rate bracket of 19.2%.
Kemp-Kasten's nominally flat rate of taxation is, then, in actuality, a progressive
three-step tax rate schedule for Workers. Congressman Kemp apparently does not
really object to progressive income taxation, he just disputes particulars.
Kemp-Kasten would radically change the treatment of capital gains. Pres-
ently, capital gains, gains from disposition of capital assets, and Section 1231 as-
sets, receive special treatment if held for more than 6 months.3 3  A taxpayer with
such gain may utilize a special deduction commonly known as the long term capi-
tal gain deduction.34 Unlike deductions of costs, this deduction is measured with
reference to gain; the bigger the gain, the bigger the deduction. 35
The two most significant arguments advanced to justify this special treatment
rest on the tax impacts of inflation and bunching of the long term gain in one year.
The disposition of capital will ordinarily require that all realized income from that
disposition be recognized in one year. Under a strictly progressive rate structure,
income accrued from a capital disposition which reflected an appreciation in the
value of the capital over several years would be aggregated and elevated to a
higher tax bracket, thus subjecting it to higher rates of taxation than if it had been
recognized as it accrued. 36 Under Kemp-Kasten, the difficulty of bunched income
being thrown up into higher rate brackets would be obviated because the marginal
tax rate for higher income is - except for the zero bracket - the same as it is for
lower income.
In addition, the present system simply determines tax liability by calculating
the difference between the purchase price and the selling price.37 This system
places no significance on the cause of the increase in price. Therefore, it is argued,
the resulting nominal gain is attributable, in part, to inflation. In contrast, gain
calculated in constant dollar terms, as allowed by Kemp-Kasten, would show only
the real gain,38 and the resulting figure would often be less than it is today. Under
Kemp-Kasten, an asset's cost would be indexed for inflation. 39 Thus, after sub-
tracting the indexed cost from the sales price, only real, or noninflationary, gain
should remain. As a result, Kemp-Kasten eliminates the two major justifications
for continuation of the present system's preferential treatment for long term capi-
tal gains. By indexing, the bill tends to reduce the absolute dollar increase in the
For a person with employment income of 0, the amount of investment income which could be treated
as employment income would be $10,000. It's a dollar for dollar sliding scale in between these two
extremes. This rule could save $480 in taxes for an unemployed person living off $10,000 plus interest
and dividends while he finds another job. It could do the same for a retired person living off invest-
ment income. It could also do the same for an idle wealthy person who would be more likely to have
$10,000 in investment income. The person who would not benefit would be the unemployed person,
or the retired person, who does not have enough investment income to be required to pay any taxes in
the first place.
33. I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3)(A)(ii)(II)(1982).
34. Id. § 1202.
35. The deduction is for 60% of the gain, leaving only 40% of the gain subject to the basic taxing provi-
sion. Id. § 1202(a). The maximum tax rate for individuals today is 50%. Id. §1. But if only 40% of
the gain is taxed, then even a person in the 50% tax rate bracket pays only 20% of the total gain in
taxes.
36. Responses to this argument are available under the present tax system (such as the failure to tax
imputed income, the failure to charge interest on the loan inherent in deferring taxation on apprecia-
tion in value until a realization event, and the fact that taxes are paid with inflated dollars), but the
context would be completely changed with Kemp-Kasten's switch to a fiat nominal rate structure.
37. I.R.C. § 1001 (1982).
38. H.R. 777, supra note 1, § 231.
39. Id. In the case of both mechanisms, indexing of basis and the switch to a nominally flat tax rate, the
solution addresses the particular situation of a specific long term capital gain transaction far better
than the crude rule of thumb presently employed in long term capital gain deduction.
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asset's value, thus limiting tax liability.' In addition, by nominally taxing all
income at the same marginal rate, Kemp-Kasten would alleviate the higher tax
burden which would attend taxing all capital gains income at progressively higher
marginal rates.
Having eliminated the major justifications for the preferential treatment, the
Kemp-Kasten bill introduced as H.R. 6165 in the last session of Congress" ,
would have repealed the long term capital gain deduction.42 Curiously, the draft-
ers of the most recent Kemp-Kasten bill have omitted the repeal provision for the
long term capital gain deduction, although the bill retains a nominally flat tax rate
structure43 and the indexing of basis provision.44 H.R. 777, instead, lowers the
deduction from 60%"5 to 40%.46 Ironically, this 40% of gain deduction, an elec-
tive alternative to the indexing of basis, represents a deduction for capital-derived
income twice as large as that allowed for labor-derived income. Moreover, Kemp-
Kasten limits the labor income exclusion to $8,000,4 7 yet places no limit on the
long term capital gain deduction.48
A comparative analysis of the exclusions or deductions individuals would re-
ceive at different income levels is revealing. A wage earner with $20,000 of em-
ployment income would get a $4,000 exclusion. The wage earner, however, must
earn $40,000 in order to receive the maximum $8,000 employment income exclu-
sion. In contrast, his wealthier neighbor would need only $10,000 of long term
40. While this approach does not consider the different rates of inflation in different assets, in different
sectors of the economy, or in different regions of the country, it would nonetheless be a rather refined
way of adjusting the gain in response to average inflation which has in fact occurred during the partic-
ular time period over which the asset has been held. While the length of time an asset has been held is
central to both reasons for the present treatment of long term capital gain-the rate bracket bunching
and inflation-Kemp-Kasten contains no holding period requirement as a prerequisite to indexing
basis.
41. H.R. 6165, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. H9037 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984); S. 2948, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 130 CONG. REC. $10,561 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1984).
42. H.R. 777 supra note 1 § 232(b).
43. Id. § 101.
44. Id. § 231.
45. I.R.C. § 1202(a) (1982).
46. H.R. 777, supra note I § 232(c). Deducting 40% of your gain is still a very significant benefit. Fur-
thermore, the gain would not be thrown up in the rate brackets.
47. See supra note 32, and accompanying text.
48. The modified long term capital gain deduction in Kemp-Kasten is elective and retains the six-month
holding period requirement. Since indexing of basis under Kemp-Kasten would require no minimum
holding period, but the modified long term capital gain deduction would, indexing would always be
selected in an inflationary economy when the holding period requirement was not met. One would
obtain the modified long term capital gain deduction by electing not to index the cost of the asset for
purposes of calculating the gain. The election is for a taxable year, not for specific transactions. The
obvious strategy for a person contemplating transactions for which inconsistent election decisions are
indicated would be to split the transactions into separate years. Those transactions for which gain
calculated with indexed basis would be less would be grouped into one year. No election would be
made for that year and indexed basis would be used. Those transactions for which the remaining gain
after the long term capital gain deduction would be less would be grouped together in the immediately
preceding or following year. An election would be made for that year to not index basis and a long
term capital gain deduction would be taken. The advantage for the taxpayer of having the option of
choosing either indexed basis or a long term capital gain deduction is obvious, but the justification is
unclear. The modified long term capital gain deduction does not appear to. be merely a transition
device. It has no expiration built into it and indexing on basis seems available for any qualifying
transaction occurring after enactment of Kemp-Kasten for all gain attributable to inflation even
though the inflation may have occurred prior to enactment. Rather, it grants preferential treatment
for any transaction involving an asset for which appreciation in value proceeded at a pace of more than
250% of the applicable inflation rate. (100% of nominal gain divided by 40% of long term capital
gain deduction yields 2.5 as a crossover point.) This would certainly include swiftly made gains and
would seem to also include investments which are speculative in nature. Since indexing of basis under
Kemp-Kasten would require no minimum holding period, but the modified long term capital gain
deduction would, indexing would always be selected in an inflationary economy when the holding
period requirement was not met.
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capital gain to receive a $4,000 deduction. Similarly, the neighbor would receive a
$16,000 long term capital gain on $40,000 income, and would continue receiving
40 cents for every additional $1 of long term capital gain without limitation. In an
extreme situation, a wage earner making $40,000 would receive the maximum
employment income exclusion of $8,000. If his wealthier neighbor realized
$100,000 in long term capital gain, then his wealthier neighbor would receive a
deduction of $40,000, equal to 100% of the wage earner's employment income.
In addition, the wealthy neighbor will receive the benefit of his own employment
income exclusion. Thus, if he has employment income, he will exclude up to
$8,000 from the first $40,000.
The preceding comparative analysis of these two taxpayers reveals the Kemp-
Kasten Bill's bias in favor of capital-derived income and the wealthy.49 The tax
rate bracket for the wage earner would be 19.2% on his first $40,000 of employ-
ment income.5" His wealthier neighbor making $40,000 of employment income
would also be in the 19.2% bracket. Both would be in the 24% bracket for addi-
tional employment income above $40,000.51. If the additional income took the
form of long term capital gains, the marginal tax rate would fall to 14.4%.52
Thus, Kemp-Kasten proposes two "flat" tax rates. The "flat" tax rate applicable
to the wage earner really has two brackets: the first 19.2% followed by 24%. The
wealthy neighbor, on the other hand, receives a rate of 14.4%. This is neither
simple nor fair.53
EVALUATION OF KEMP-KASTEN
The first source of progressivity in the Kemp-Kasten tax structure, the zero
bracket amount, would equally benefit all taxpayers at the same economic income
levels. Therefore, there is no subsidy effect.54 The second source of progressivity,
the 20% exclusion for the first $40,000 of employment income is not a feature of
the nominal tax rates. As an adjustment to the taxable base for taxpayers with
one type of income, and not for all taxpayers at the same economic income level, it
benefits only some taxpayers. Those taxpayers receive the benefit through a tax
expenditure mechanism. This benefits workers, and since the tax benefit is elimi-
nated for employment income above $40,000" higher income people do not bene-
fit the most.
Moreover, the nominal rate structure's general flatness means that the tax ben-
efit for each dollar of special exclusion or deduction remains constant throughout
49. I will ignore the zero bracket amount and personal exemption deductions, which would be available to
both taxpayers, in the interest of simplicity.
50. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
51. H.R. 777, supra note 1, § 101. It will be recalled that the 20% exclusion for the first $40,000 of
employment income is the reason the nominal rate of 24% would be, in effect, 19.2% before it would
jump to 24%. But with a 40% exclusion, the tax bracket for the recipient of long term capital gain
would be 60% of the nominal rate. Thus, it would be a tax rate of 14.4%.
52. As discussed above the better-off taxpayer would more frequently benefit from this lower rate because
he would have the capital with which to engage in long term capital transactions.
53. Due to the extent of long term capital gains transactions which occur, the total subsidy within the
economy is large. The tax subsidy received on long term capital gain under Kemp-Kasten would be
the amount of gain multiplied by 40% (the percent of gain allowed as a deduction), further multiplied
by the 24% nominal rate bracket. This is precisely because 40% of the gain is the amount which is
not subject to the nominal tax rate. For each $1 of long term capital gain, the subsidy is, therefore, 9.6
cents. For each $1,000, it is $96. For $10,000 it is $960. One must wonder what the reaction would
be to this program if it were introduced in the form of a direct outlay.
54. The fact that the zero bracket amount is different for different categories of taxpayers in the Kemp-
Kasten proposal, as it is under current law, provides the basis for arguing that the differences would
have a subsidy effect but one too insignificant for concern here.
55. H.R. 777, supra note 1, § 134(b).
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the income range over which it is allowed.5 6 Kemp-Kasten, therefore, removes
the progressive nominal rate structure as a mechanism for providing higher in-
come taxpayers with larger tax subsidies. Yet reform could be better achieved by
retaining the nominal rate structure while converting all special exclusions and
deductions to tax credits.
Nonetheless, this is a positive change, moving the taxation system toward the
theoretical underpinning of progressive taxation - taxation on the basis of ability
to pay - ceteris paribus.57  Of course, all other things are not equal. Kemp-
Kasten removes progressivity itself from the nominal rate structure. 58 Kemp-
Kasten's indirect retention of progressivity for most workers by manipulating
their tax base conceals the flat portion of the nominal tax rate's principal effect:
capital will not be taxed according to the ability to pay principle. Although
Kemp-Kasten eliminates one source of the wealthy's receipt of larger subsidies
from special exclusions and deductions by removing the progressive nominal rate
structure, it retains other special exclusions, deductions and credits benefitting the
wealthy. Furthermore, higher income taxpayers will still have more money with
which to engage in transactions producing these special benefits. Indeed upper
income taxpayers may still manipulate the tax system under the Kemp-Kasten
proposal to avoid paying any taxes in a given year.59
Kemp-Kasten is not simple, and it violates the notion of fairness embodied in
the idea of taxing people on the basis of their ability to pay. Kemp-Kasten
would continue a system based on the inability to pay. It stems from Kemp-
Kasten's carryover of the twin problems of the present system - the failure to
measure income and the failure to tax it once and only once. Kemp-Kasten's
failure to retain a significantly progressive nominal rate structure increases the
potential for regressive effective tax rates. Kemp-Kasten retains a vast spending
apparatus built into the revenue raising system. The contradiction remains.
The reduction in the number, and possibly in the dollar effect, of subsidies
given as tax expenditures is a positive feature of the Kemp-Kasten proposal. The
removal of a significantly progressive rate structure as the nominal starting point
is a negative. If these two changes, help shift the debate to the rate structure and
away from tax incentives social or economic objectives, then Kemp-Kasten would
have a beneficial net effect. Neutral or regressive taxation would be more palat-
able if achieved openly and notoriously.
The Kemp-Kasten proposal, however, attempts to shift discussion toward the
rate without justification, since most tax subsidies would be retained. The rate
56. The benefit does not get larger as income increases since moving to a higher income level does not
entail moving to a higher rate bracket.
57. The theoretical underpinning of a progressive tax rate structure is that a taxpayer pays taxes in an
increasing proportion to his wealth. See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE 215-16 (1976).
58. Except for the zero bracket amount, the policy of taxation on the basis of ability to pay is removed
completely from the nominal rate structure.
59. If a taxpayer realizes $100,000 in gain from sale of corporate stock held for seven months, even ignor-
ing the zero bracket amount and personal exemptions, his tax liability would only be $14,400. A long
term capital gain deduction of $40,000 would leave $60,000 subject to the 24% tax rate, for $14,400 of
tax due and effective tax rate of 14.4%. This taxpayer has just received a special deduction of $40,000.
He only needs additional special deductions of $60,000 to wipe out his taxable income and eliminate
his tax liability. They would be readily available under Kemp-Kasten. If this "taxpayer" paid $40,000
in mortgage interest he would have his special deduction and his tax liability would be eliminated.
This is not taxation on the basis of ability to pay-it is not taxation at all. It is welfare for the wealthy.
Since higher income people will be better able to achieve a lower effective tax rate by virtue of the
capital which is, or is becoming, available to them, it is theoretically possible that the effective rate
structure under Kemp-Kasten would be regressive overall. It would undoubtedly be so for many,
many people.
60. See J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 52 (1971).
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structure emphasized in justifying the proposal - as under the present Code - is
nominal only. The actual, effective rates of taxation achieved under Kemp-Kas-
ten are no more obvious from reading Congressman Kemp's article and bill than
they are upon reading current Federal income taxation law. While the specific
provisions of law are explicit in the bill, the overall economic effects, pursuant to
the proposal or under present law, are not widely understood. People think in
terms of tax rates as they find them stated, in tables and schedules, or as a flat
rate. They do not think in terms of effective tax rates after taking tax subsidies
into account. The tax expenditure budget is a part of the official budget of the
United States, but how many Americans know of it?61
Congressman Kemp maintains in his article that tax burdens on the various
income classes would be the same as they are today.62 He also claims that work-
ers will pay less taxes under his proposal.63 It is difficult to see how both can be
true. He also claims his proposal will raise as much in revenues as the present
system.64 It cannot all be true.
I wish to emphasize that theoretical policy analysis is not the principal basis
on which to judge the Kemp-Kasten proposal. It should be judged primarily on
the basis of its projected results as generated by econometric models used in com-
parison with today's results. Limiting my analysis to what falls within the four
corners of the two documents I have considered, H.R. 777 and Congressman
Kemp's article, it is unclear to me which set of results I would prefer. If I could
vote today, I would vote against Kemp-Kasten. But I would vote against the
present system of taxation as well.
61. A projected tax expenditure budget estimating the results under Kemp-Kasten, and preferably com-
paring those results with the status quo, is not, as far as I am aware, yet available.
62. Kemp, supra note 2, at 16.
63. Id. at 15-16.
64. Id. at 16.
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